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It gives me great pleasure to introduce our 
Newsletter, though Tim Crane is a hard 
act to follow, and we miss him. It has been 
an eventful time, but there is much to 
celebrate. We are delighted to welcome two 
new University Lecturers: Jessie Munton, 
in Philosophy of Mind and Epistemology; 
and Julia Borcherding, in Early Modern 
Philosophy. We also welcome Jo Harcus, 
Casimir Lewy Librarian and Newsletter 
Editor. Last time we reported our memorial 
event for Casimir Lewy, and it has been 
fascinating for me to learn more about 
him and the history of our unique Library, 
created with significant alumni support, 
and so vital for our students. (For staff and 
student news see p. 8). On the research 
front, there have been some exciting 
initiatives and awards (see p. 8). We received 
a glowing report by an independent panel 
(leading a ‘Strategic Research Review’) who 
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were ‘highly impressed with the sense of 
dynamism across the Faculty’, said our ‘high 
international ranking is clearly merited’, and 
we are ‘a genuinely world-leading group of 
researchers, of which the University can be 
proud’. They also noted some challenges 
due to our small size, but it was good to 
have their assessment, as well as their 
advice. We are working on a diverse range 
of topics, and you will get a taste of some of 
them in the pages ahead. 
There are wider political uncertainties, 
significant to the University as well the 
nation, whose themes have been reflected 
in recent Faculty activities. Onora O’Neill 
spoke on ‘Ethics for Communication in a 
Digital Age’ at the Routledge Lecture 2019, 
arguing that digital technologies have 
failed to fulfill their democratic promise, 
because prevailing communicative 
norms are inadequate, and readily 
bypassed through anonymity. At the 2018 
Alumni Festival I spoke on ‘Post-truth as 
Post-democracy’, where the audience 
contributed their own views (see p. 5). The 
uncertainties are spurring new alliances, 
e.g. a newly-forged partnership between 
Cambridge and Ludwig Maximilian 
University (Munich): we are looking into 
collaborations in moral psychology, 
decision theory, Kant, and philosophy of 
physics. Whatever the future holds, we’ll 
be able to face it with energy and ideas, 
and with the support of our friends and 
alumni—and for this we are very grateful.
Upcoming Faculty Events
Alumni Festival 2019
28 September 2019
‘If your symptoms are influenced 
by your attitude, does this make 
them psychosomatic?‘ with Richard 
Holton. This builds on his 2018 
Uehiro lectures (see p. 2). For further 
information go to www.alumni.cam.
ac.uk/events/alumni-festival-2019. 
Festival of Ideas 2019
18 and 25 October 2019
‘Climate Conversations’, with the 
Faculty of Philosophy in collaboration 
with Extinction Rebellion Cambridge.
24 October 2019
Panel discussion on ‘Hate Speech, 
Xenophobia, and Trolls’, with Rae 
Langton (Philosophy), Mary Beard 
(Classics), Andy Martin (Modern 
and Medieval Languages), and 
journalists Sean O’Grady and Kuba 
Shand-Baptiste (The Independent). 
For further information and booking 
go to www.festivalofideas.cam.ac.uk.
For information about future Faculty 
events go to www.phil.cam.ac.uk/events.
This lecture series, hosted by the Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics 
in Oxford, asked me to ‘bring the best scholarship in analytic 
philosophy to bear on the most significant problems of our time’. 
A tough call, but my hope was that investigating the role of the 
social in three pressing mental health problems—dementia, 
addiction, and psychosomatic illness—might go some way to 
fitting the bill.
Start with dementia. On a broadly Lockean picture of personal 
identity, as memory is lost, so is the person. That is a common 
Non-Categorical Thought
Arif Ahmed
‘Illness and the 
Social Self’
Richard Holton at the 
2018 Uehiro Lectures
Many of the most important things 
we say and think are not about reality. 
Or not in the straightforward way that 
many statements of everyday life and 
natural science are about it. When you 
say that the M11 connects Cambridge 
to London or that people evolved from 
apes, you are talking about reality. 
But what about the moral thought 
that stealing is wrong? Or the modal 
thought that two and two necessarily 
make four? Or the conditional thought 
that if stealing apples is wrong then so 
is stealing oranges?
These thoughts seem to owe their rightness to facts for which 
nature lacks room. Mackie made vivid how uncomfortably the 
metaphysical inertia of brute facts sits with the motivational 
magnetism that anything worth calling a moral fact would have to 
exert. Hume pointed out the total absence of ‘must-ness’ from any 
experience: ‘green’ describes how some things look; but ‘necessarily 
green’ doesn’t describe how anything could look. David Lewis 
showed in the 1970s that no fact could possibly take the shape that 
any facts reported by ‘if… then’ statements would have to have. 
With regards to some of these kinds of thoughts, one might say 
that they are false and should be discarded. Or one might say that 
those thoughts are really all right because they are not even trying 
to describe the facts. They are trying to do something else. Unlike 
the flat reports of everyday life and of natural science, they are in this 
sense non-categorical. 
In March 2019 Cambridge hosted a one-day conference on the 
subject. It was part of the European Non-Categorical Thinking 
Project, in which scholars in linguistics, philosophy and psychology 
from Amsterdam, Cambridge, Trinity College Dublin, Leeds, Paris, 
Turin and more recently St Andrews have joined forces to establish 
what non-categorical thinking could be, if it could be anything. 
My own talk argued that if we distinguish subjective and objective 
moral obligation, plausible constraints on the former imply that 
nothing could answer to the latter. I therefore regard objective 
morality as an illusion. I also believe that what sustains it is the need 
to preserve certain kinds of interpersonal power-relation.
The next talk, by psychologist Ruth Byrne, reviewed and drew 
interesting philosophical conclusions from recent experimental 
work on conditional thought. Byrne argued that when we think 
about factual conditionals (‘If it was a good year then there were 
roses’) we focus on one possibility. But when we think about 
counterfactual conditionals (‘If it had rained then the match would 
have been cancelled’), we think about multiple possibilities. She 
formulated a proposal about how in the second case we keep track 
of such possibilities. 
Philosopher Max Jones examined possible evolutionary 
explanations of counterfactual thought. These explanations 
undermine the idea that counterfactual thought can support 
knowledge of possibility and necessity. But on Jones’s view what this 
shows is only that the evolutionary account was itself misguided.
Philosophers John Divers and Shyane Siriwardena also discussed 
modality, arguing against recent attempts to connect modal 
thought with objective probability. Their argument supported 
Quine’s view that modal thought, particularly concerning 
‘metaphysical’ possibility and necessity, has no place in a 
scientifically mature vision of the universe. 
Logician Vincenzo Crupi turned back to conditional thought. 
His talk described three ways of interpreting ‘if ’ and categorised 
the often-surprising logical differences between them. There is an 
intimate connection between this subject and the idea, central to 
empiricism, that a datum can confirm a scientific theory to a greater 
or lesser extent. The session concluded with a lively discussion of 
Crupi’s own proposals for measuring confirmation. 
If Mary met every king or every queen of Europe and Mary 
met the king of Spain, does it follow that Mary met every king of 
Europe? Anyone who studied first-year logic at Cambridge will see 
immediately that it doesn’t. But almost everyone else, when asked, 
will say that it does. In the final talk linguistics expert Salvador 
Mascarenhas cited this fallacy, and the empirical studies connected 
with it, as evidence for his own novel model of human reasoning. 
Mascarenhas sees reasoning as a process in which we test a specific 
hypothesis rather than just ‘updating’ in accordance with the 
Bayesian model. 
In addition to what I learnt from the other speakers I ended the 
day with a general conclusion. Progress in philosophy is most likely 
when it engages with other fields of enquiry. Philosophically, the 
most fruitful kind of ‘interdisciplinarity’ – as in this event – involves, 
not appropriating questions that other disciplines already address, 
but rather redirecting their methods towards the basic and vital 
issues that have always animated our subject. 
Arif Ahmed is a Reader in the Faculty.
Arif Ahmed
My own talk argued that if we distinguish 
subjective and objective moral obligation, 
plausible constraints on the former imply that 
nothing could answer to the latter.
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Jean Baptiste Van Helmont to its influence on John Locke’s An 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding. The workshop ended up 
focusing in particular on the philosophy of Anne Conway, whose 
The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy is not only an 
essential text of early modern vitalism but also an important part of a 
now-emerging canon of early modern women philosophers. As the 
workshop forcefully brought to light, early modern vitalism was both 
a worthy opponent for and an important corrective to early modern 
mechanism. Its proponents are more than deserving of our continued 
scholarly attention.
Vitalism in Early Modern Philosophy
Julia Borcherding and Matthew Leisinger
Anne Conway in a detail from Samuel van Hoogstraten’s ‘Perspective View 
with a Woman Reading a Letter’, courtesy of Mauritshuis, The Hague.
Descartes is famous for dividing the world in two, distinguishing 
the mechanistic realm of extended bodies from the mental realm 
of thinking minds. This distinction often frames the philosophical 
narratives that we tell about the early modern period: dualists face 
the challenge of explaining the apparent interaction between 
mind and body, materialists must explain how bare matter in 
motion could give rise to thought, idealists cut the Gordian knot by 
declaring that all is mental, and so on.
One difficulty with this story is that it obscures an important 
family of views that enjoyed considerable support throughout 
the early modern period. Sometimes dismissed as an outmoded 
relic of the Renaissance, early modern vitalism was in fact a 
rich and influential philosophical movement that rejected the 
mechanistic worldview that Descartes was so instrumental in 
promoting. While disagreeing about some of the details, early 
modern vitalists were united by a commitment to the irreducibility 
and universality of life throughout the physical world. Some were 
dualists. The ‘Cambridge Platonists’ Ralph Cudworth and Henry 
More, for example, posited immaterial, ‘plastic’ powers responsible 
for animating the world of passive matter. Others were monists. 
Anne Conway and Margaret Cavendish, for instance, argued that 
all substance is essentially alive and perceptive and, consequently, 
viewed the difference between mind and body as merely one of 
degree rather than one of kind. But all, whether dualist or monist, 
agreed that mechanism had to be rejected as an irremediably 
impoverished account of the created world.
The story of early modern vitalism is beginning to receive greater 
attention. This March, with the generous support of the Faculty 
of Philosophy, the Faculty of Divinity, the Cambridge Centre for 
the Study of Platonism, Emmanuel College, the Mind Association, 
and the British Society for the History of Philosophy, we hosted a 
workshop entitled ‘Vitalism in Early Modern Philosophy’ in Emmanuel 
College. It brought together a diverse group of scholars to examine 
vitalism as a philosophical movement in the early modern period, 
stretching from its early manifestations in Francis Bacon and 
Richard Holton is Professor of Philosophy in the Faculty.
Julia Borcherding is a Lecturer in the Faculty. Matthew 
Leisinger is a Junior Research Fellow in Emmanuel College.
description of what happens with 
dementia. But dementia doesn’t 
bring a simple destruction of 
memory. The problem, at least 
initially, is one of access: many 
memories can be brought back 
with prompting and scaffolding, 
which thoughtful family and friends 
will naturally offer. Others always 
have some role in maintaining our 
identity, but in dementia their role 
becomes central.
Now consider addiction. Recent work there has stressed the 
importance of cues that trigger desire. Such cues are frequently social. 
Rather than thinking of desires as originating from within, their driving 
force often comes from without; again the construction of the self, in 
this case its desires, turns out to be social. Two consequences follow. 
One concerns the authority of desire: maximising desire-satisfaction 
seems a less obvious goal, once we understand the cue-dependence 
of desires. Another concerns responsibility: the provision of cues is 
akin to pollution, for which the provider, rather than the recipient, 
may bear primary responsibility.
Finally, consider psychosomatic illness. Many illnesses have been 
thought, controversially, to have a psychosomatic component. 
If we can distinguish organic and mental illness, psychosomatic 
illness might be the latter, masquerading as  
the former. But if the mental is physical, hence organic, this  
will not help.
Alternatively, psychosomatic illness might be those whose 
symptoms are influenced by patients’ attitudes. But if you 
aggravate a bad back by refusing to exercise, mistakenly thinking 
it’s dangerous, your symptoms are influenced by your attitude 
but are surely not psychosomatic. Perhaps there is no sharp cut-
off; and any hard and fast distinction here is more a reflection 
of our social attitudes than of any underlying condition.
Richard Holton
Credit: Peterhouse
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Philosophy and Model Theory
Tim Button
You probably know the game 20 Questions. 
Your friend thinks of an object, then you 
have twenty yes/no questions to try to 
figure out what that object is.
Once you’ve played the game a few 
times, you might find yourself pondering: 
Why twenty questions? How many questions 
do I really need? Ponder that for a bit longer, 
and you’ll probably end up asking two more 
precise questions about the game:
Question A: What’s the smallest number 
of questions I might ask, and happen to 
figure out what the object is?
Question B: What’s the smallest number 
of questions I would need to be allowed to 
ask, to be sure that I can figure out what the 
object is (no matter what it is)?
Question A has a simple answer: One. You 
could start the game by asking, ‘are you 
thinking of the bell on the desk of the 
Casimir Lewy Library?’ Granted, that would 
be an odd opening question. Still, if the 
answer is ‘yes’, then you got lucky.
Question B is rather harder. To begin 
tackling it, let’s make the setup easier, and 
suppose that your friend agrees to choose 
her object from a predetermined list of just 
16 objects. In that case, you need only 4 
questions to be certain you can figure out 
which object she chose. 
To see why, try thinking of the possible 
games of 20 Questions as a Christmas tree. 
You start at the top of the tree, beside the 
ornamental star, and begin asking your 
questions. Let’s say that you follow the 
left branch of the tree if the answer is ‘yes’, 
and the right branch if the answer is ‘no’. 
Each path, from the star down through the 
branches of the tree, represents a possible 
pattern of answers. After 4 questions, there 
are 16 different paths through the tree. So, 
since your friend has agreed to choose 
from a list of 16 objects, by selecting your 
questions wisely, you can ensure that each 
of the 16 objects is uniquely associated with 
some branch on the tree, i.e. with some 
unique possible pattern of responses to 
your questions. 
Now let’s think about what happens 
as we allow your friend to choose from 
a longer list, and for you to ask more 
questions. After 20 questions, you have a 
tree with 220 – i.e. just over a million – paths. 
So, with 20 well-chosen questions, you can 
handle a list with just over a million items on 
it. And generally, with n questions, you can 
handle a list with 2n items.
* * *
When selecting an object for 20 Questions, 
most people choose celebrities, or animals, 
or landmarks, or whatever. But now 
imagine playing 20 Questions against a 
mathematician, who tells you that she will 
choose some infinite mathematical structure. 
As usual, your aim is to ask questions, to 
figure out which structure she has in mind. 
What is ‘an infinite mathematical 
structure’? Well, that’s a system, comprised 
of infinitely many mathematical objects, 
related to one another in certain 
distinctively mathematical ways. For 
example, the integers (i.e. the positive and 
negative whole numbers, together with 
zero) constitute an infinite mathematical 
structure: there are infinitely many of them, 
and we can characterise the relations 
between them in terms of +, ×, and <. 
Equally, the rationals (i.e. anything which can 
be expressed as a fraction) constitute an 
infinite mathematical structure. But there are 
plenty of other structures: e.g. the rationals 
but without the number ½; the structure 
which consists of seventeen distinct copies 
of the integers; or whatever.
Your task, to repeat, is to ask questions 
and work out which structure your friend 
has in mind. So, how many questions do you 
need to ask? As in the non-mathematical 
version of the game, we can break that 
thought down into two parts. 
Start with Question A: What’s the smallest 
number of questions you would need to be 
allowed to ask, to be sure that you can figure 
out the structure? Sadly, the answer is: No 
number of questions can suffice. Not even 
some infinite number will do. There are just 
too many structures.
Now Question B: What is the least number 
of questions you might ask, and happen to 
figure out the structure? Naïvely, the answer 
should be: One. After all, you might start 
the game by asking, ‘are you thinking of the 
integers?’ And you might just get lucky. 
But suppose that your friend tweaks 
the rules of the game slightly. In the 
tweaked game, you’re banned from using 
shorthand phrases like ‘the integers’, or 
‘the rationals’. Instead, all of your questions 
have to be phrased solely in terms of how 
the elements of the structure relate to 
one another. (To illustrate: maybe you’ve 
figured out that the elements of your 
friend’s structure are arranged as a line. 
Then you could ask ‘between any two 
elements, is there always another element?’ 
If your friend is thinking of the integers, 
she’ll have to say ‘no’; if she is thinking of 
the rationals, she’ll have to say ‘yes’.)
This tweak to the rules changes the 
answer to Question B in a dramatic way. 
Given the tweak, no matter how lucky you 
get, no number of questions will allow you to 
figure out what structure she has in mind. You 
literally can’t win.
This fact follows from a mathematical 
result which I’ll revisit below. But it is 
deeply puzzling. Our game began, even 
before any questions were asked, with our 
mathematician friend thinking of some 
particular structure. We now know that she 
cannot articulate which structure she has 
in mind, just by saying how the elements 
of that structure relate to one another. Well 
then: How on Earth did she come to think 
of that particular structure in the first place? 
Clearly not by articulating how its elements 
relate to one another; so, how? 
* * *
Last year, Sean Walsh and I published 
Philosophy and Model Theory. The 
‘philosophy’ bit should ring a bell; ‘model 
theory’, perhaps not.
Model theory is a branch of pure 
mathematics which studies mathematical 
structures. It has powerful tools for 
describing such structures. And they also 
have a precisely defined notion – satisfaction 
– which they use in place of the intuitive 
idea that a sentence can be true (or false) in 
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a structure. (As e.g. the sentence ‘between 
any two elements, there is another element’ 
is false in the integers, but true in the 
rationals.) A structure which satisfies some 
sentences is also said to be a model of those 
sentences. Hence the name, model theory. 
Back to 20 Questions. When you phrase 
your questions in terms of how the 
elements of the structure relate to one 
another, the answers you get tell you which 
sentences are true (or false) in a structure. In 
the model theorist’s terms, you are learning 
which sentences the structure satisfies. 
Now, here is the first deep result of model 
theory: if some infinite structure satisfies some 
sentences, so too do infinitely many other 
structures. This is known as the Löwenheim–
Skolem Theorem. (I can’t prove it here, but 
one proof involves thinking more about 
(Christmas) trees, as above.)
This result explains why you can’t win 
the tweaked version of 20 Questions. And, 
more generally, it forces us to confront the 
question: How could we ever come to think 
about a particular mathematical structure? 
(Not by listing what the structure satisfies; 
so, how?) This is a deep philosophical 
question associated with model theory. 
And ultimately – according to Sean and 
me, at least – it forces us to reexamine the 
very idea of ‘thinking about a mathematical 
structure’, and hence to re-examine what it 
means to engage in mathematical thought.
This is just one of the deep philosophical 
issues raised by model theory. There are 
many others. And philosophers routinely 
employ model theory throughout their 
work. But, when Sean and I set out to write 
Philosophy and Model Theory, no one had 
yet offered a systematic treatment of either 
the philosophical uses of model theory, or 
the philosophy of model theory. We have 
aimed to do both; to trace the dialectical 
contours of those points where philosophy 
and model theory meet one another. But 
we present our book, not as a final word 
on what philosophically inclined model 
theorists and model-theoretically inclined 
philosophers should do. Rather, it’s an 
invitation to join in. 
‘We’ve entered a post-truth world and there’s no going back’ said 
the Independent in 2016, when ‘post-truth’ became the ‘word of 
the year’ for some dictionaries. That phrase and others like ‘fake 
news’ and ‘alternative facts’ have been much in the air since then. 
At this Alumni event we gathered for a lively discussion about the 
role of truth and knowledge in a democracy. Have recent political 
events landed us in a ‘post-truth’ world? Those in the audience were 
canvassed for their views after the lecture, and their engagement 
made it an especially memorable event. 
Our theme was ‘post-truth as post-democracy’. Abandoning truth 
would be the death of democracy, not a healthy free speech free-
for-all, I argued. The basic idea, to oversimplify: democracy depends 
on choice, and choice depends on knowledge. That is a familiar 
thought, with some philosophical roots in J. S. Mill and Immanuel 
Kant. Reports of the death of truth have fortunately been somewhat 
exaggerated (to borrow a line from Mark Twain). No-one is actually 
giving up on truth, for mundane matters of telling the time, or 
finding a venue for dinner. So ‘post-truth’ involves something else: 
not caring enough about truth, or being swayed by irrelevant 
factors—‘objective facts are less influential in shaping public 
opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief’, as the Oxford 
Dictionaries put it. But this can indeed damage the democratic 
process, and we discussed some examples from recent US and UK 
political communication. 
Some say free speech is about saying whatever you like, but 
according to Mill, truth is what gives free speech its point. We need 
free speech, because otherwise we are ruling out sources of truth, or 
knowledge: we can learn from hearing true, or partly true, opinions, 
and from contesting false ones. And why does knowledge matter? 
‘Post-truth as Post-democracy’
Rae Langton at the Alumni Festival, September 2018
Partly for its own sake, as part of our ‘mental well-being’, for Mill. And 
also, to bring in Kant, because when we choose to do something, 
we need to know what we’re doing. A familiar application is the 
‘informed consent’ expected in medical contexts. If you go in for 
a procedure with the deceived impression it’s a minor biopsy, and 
it’s actually an amputation, then something has gone wrong. If you 
didn’t know, it wasn’t fully your choice. Should the same apply to 
politics, to our votes in elections and referenda? Is a deceived choice 
not fully a choice? 
When these questions were put to the Alumni audience, most 
(57%) disagreed with the journalist who said, ‘We’ve entered a post-
truth world and there’s no going back’ (25% agreed, the remainder 
were in neither camp). Several agreed with ‘we’ve entered a post-
truth world’, but not the second part: they hoped for a way of going 
back. A large majority (87%) agreed that ‘fake news is a serious threat 
to democracy’ (7% disagreed, the remainder neither). When asked 
about ‘informed medical consent’, nearly all (96%) agreed that ‘a 
patient’s genuine choice depends on their doctor telling the truth’ 
(1% disagreed, the remainder neither). When asked about ‘informed 
voting’, most (82%) agreed that ‘a citizen’s genuine choice depends 
on politicians and media telling the truth’ (2% disagreed, the 
remainder neither). Sample comments: ‘a citizen has a duty to think 
for themselves’, ‘we expect politicians and the media to lie’, ‘emotion 
necessarily enters into decision-making’, ‘debate is essential’, ‘taken 
away: the idea of knowing truth as freedom’. The positive comments 
were much appreciated: ‘I love the Philosophy lectures, the Alumni 
Festival needs more of them’, ‘Thought-provoking, enlightening’, 
and (a favourite) ‘Hi I’m 13 and you made me feel like I want to do 
this when I’m older, so thank you… my Mum is an alumni’. 
Tim Button was, until recently, 
University Senior Lecturer at 
Cambridge and a Fellow of St John’s 
College. His book Philosophy and Model 
Theory, written with Sean Walsh, was 
published by Oxford University Press 
in 2018. 
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Philosophy and Minorities (MAP)
Azita Chellappoo
The Cambridge chapter of Minorities and Philosophy has been 
running since Michaelmas 2017 (after a decision to transform the 
Cambridge Women in Philosophy group to a MAP chapter). Our 
goals are to address minority issues in the profession, provide a 
space to discuss theoretical issues regarding philosophy of gender, 
race, sexual orientation, class, disability, native language, etc., and 
highlight philosophy done from minority perspectives. We also 
aim to foster a community of students and staff of marginalised 
identities in the discipline in Cambridge. Our events are open 
to all, and we encourage participation from a range of Faculties, 
Departments, and Centres, including Philosophy, History and 
Philosophy of Science (HPS), Classics, and Gender Studies.
Over the past two years we have held film screenings, hosted 
speakers, and held mentoring events. We have hosted talks on 
antiracism, feminism, and multiculturalism, and we have run a 
reading group on the intersection of gender, race and disability  
with philosophy of science. We appreciate the generous support 
from the Faculty of Philosophy, the Department of HPS and the 
Faculty of Classics.
In June 2018 we held a conference on ‘Power and Identity: 
Philosophical Reflections on Liberation’, with a mix of invited speakers 
and students from Cambridge and beyond. We ended with a round 
table discussion on diversity and ‘decolonisation’, led by individuals 
active in curriculum efforts within and beyond Philosophy. 
In Michaelmas Term 2018 Dr. Paulina Sliwa, from the Philosophy 
Faculty, gave a talk on the topic of moral testimony and 
‘hermeneutical advice’. Some philosophers have complained that 
moral testimony can do cognitive but not emotional work: we 
can learn the right thing to do, but not how to feel about it. This 
overlooks the importance of a different kind of advice, which can 
help us to make sense of our moral experience. When we take this 
into account, it becomes clear that moral testimony can change 
hearts as well as minds, argued Dr. Sliwa. 
We also held a round table discussion on the topic of sexual 
harassment, led by a panel which included Dr. Marta Halina from 
HPS, Philosophy postgraduates, and others. This was a productive 
discussion, looking into possible explanations for sexual harassment 
in academia, its possible contribution to the underrepresentation of 
women, and the institutional barriers that could make it harder to 
hold sexual harassers to account. Practical advice was shared during 
an open discussion at the end. 
Towards the end of Michaelmas term, we ran a mentoring  
event led by Dr. Rosie Worsdale, a postdoctoral researcher from 
CRASSH, along with minority background postgraduates from 
Philosophy and HPS, who shared their experiences, discussing their 
personal career path so far, what made them decide to pursue 
academic research, the obstacles they have faced as minorities 
in the field, and dealing with ‘imposter syndrome’, a pattern of 
self-doubt to which members of minority groups can be more 
vulnerable. Again, practical advice was shared during an open 
discussion at the end. 
In the year to come we plan to continue hosting speaker events, 
as well as panel discussions and events that will bring students of 
marginalised identities together to share their work and experiences. 
For more on Cambridge MAP see: https://www.phil.cam.ac.uk/
seminars-phil/cambridge-MAP. Background information 
on women in Philosophy can be found at https://www.bpa.
ac.uk/resources/women-in-philosophy/wip-committee.
Azita Chellappoo (left) and Laura Brassington (right) organisers of the  
‘Power and Identity’ Map Conference 2018
Azita Chellappoo (Wolfson) is a PhD Student in History and 
Philosophy of Science and Co-organiser of the Cambridge 
chapter of Minorities and Philosophy. 
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Sharon Krause on the Emancipation of Nature
Maxime Lepoutre
During her stay as Faculty Visitor, Professor 
Sharon Krause of Brown University 
delivered two papers in which she 
outlined a distinctive environmentalist 
ideal. Environmental justice, according to 
Krause, requires both developing political 
institutions that prevent human beings from 
dominating nature, and cultivating an ethos 
of respect for nature. 
In ‘Environmental Domination and the 
Politics of Eco-Emancipation’, Krause argues 
for ‘ecological emancipation’, the liberation 
of nature from domination by human 
beings. Domination is the condition of 
being at the mercy of another: a person is 
dominated when her well-being depends 
on the unchecked or arbitrary decisions of 
others. The concept of domination has long 
been central to the republican tradition of 
political thought. For republican theorists, 
it is inherently wrong for one person’s will 
to be subjected to the unchecked decisions 
of another. Depending on the good grace 
of a master or despot, however benevolent 
or enlightened they may be, degrades 
one’s status and jeopardises one’s freedom. 
Democracy is a way of counteracting this 
domination: when everyone has a vote over 
decisions that affect them, those decisions 
are forced to track their concerns, and are 
therefore no longer arbitrary.
While Krause concurs with the idea 
that domination is wrong, she contends 
that republicans have applied this idea 
too restrictively. By focusing exclusively 
on domination of people by people, 
republicans have overlooked the way in 
which non-human living things too can 
be dominated. Human beings habitually 
use and disrupt nature in ways that are 
limitless and unconstrained. In fact, our 
domination over nature is so deeply 
entrenched that we find it hard to imagine 
that things could be otherwise. This fatalism 
is precisely what Krause wants us to resist. 
In this, her project bears similarities to 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s in his Discourse 
on the Origin of Inequality. Rousseau argued 
that interpersonal inequalities between 
human beings, far from being natural, are 
the product of contingent social practices 
and institutions. Having de-naturalised 
interpersonal inequality, Rousseau paved 
the way for thinking about how, with 
different social practices, equality could 
be restored. In the same way, Krause 
emphasises that our exercise of limitless 
and unconstrained power over nature 
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is in no way ‘natural’ or ‘inescapable’. It 
results from the way our political and social 
institutions are currently arranged—and 
these could be arranged differently. 
What could it mean to protect nature 
from domination? The idea might seem 
puzzling. The standard democratic solution 
for counteracting domination is to promote 
the contestation of power through universal 
suffrage and public deliberation. But oaks 
cannot vote, and cats aren’t fond of public 
speech. Instead, then, Krause advances two 
alternative solutions. The first is to constrain 
and regulate the systems of economic 
production that incentivise the limitless 
exercise of power over nature. The second 
is eco-constitutionalism: enshrining basic 
protections for nature in constitutions, 
which take key features of nature’s well-
being out of the fray of democratic politics. 
In ‘Political Respect for Nature’, Krause 
moves beyond the question of how we 
should restructure political institutions, 
to the issue of what ethos or attitudes 
we should cultivate towards nature. Here, 
Krause draws on Kant’s idea of respect. 
Respect, for Kant, requires treating persons 
‘never merely as means, but also as ends 
in themselves’. It is disrespectful, in other 
words, to treat others simply as our tools 
or instruments. As in her discussion of 
domination, Krause argues that Kant applies 
this idea too restrictively. For Kant, the basis 
for respect is rationality, which involves 
the ability to consider and adopt ends for 
oneself. But non-rational living beings too 
are owed respect. They too should not be 
regarded as mere instruments for our use.
What is the basis for this respect? Why 
is it wrong to see trees as mere timber? 
While they may not be able to consider and 
adopt ends, animals and plants nevertheless 
have internal goals, ways of flourishing and 
developing, which ‘exceed the purposes of 
others’. It is better for a pine to flourish than 
to wither, and what it means for a pine to 
flourish is independent of—and sometimes 
enters into conflict with—the uses we have 
for it. Krause presses this point by bringing 
the Kantian tradition into closer dialogue 
with Emmanuel Levinas. For Levinas, what 
grounds the need for a moral response is 
not something as lofty as rationality: it is 
the mere ‘alterity’, or otherness, of living 
beings—the fact that they have modes 
of flourishing that differ from, and are 
irreducible to, our own. By thus expanding 
our understanding of familiar ethical 
ideals—Kantian respect as well as freedom 
from domination—Krause opens us to a 
new and unsettling way of thinking about 
nature and the demands it makes on us.
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Faculty and Staff News
Welcome to Julia Borcherding, 
who joined the Faculty as University 
Lecturer in 2018. She works mainly in 
Early Modern Philosophy, especially 
Leibniz and the Cambridge Platonists. 
Welcome also to Jessie Munton, who 
joined the Faculty as University Lecturer 
in 2018. She works mainly in Philosophy 
of Mind, Philosophy of Perception and 
Epistemology.
Promotions, Honours and Awards
Congratulations to Clare Chambers 
who was promoted to Reader in Political 
Philosophy in 2018, Rae Langton who 
was appointed Knightbridge Professor 
in 2017, and Paulina Sliwa who was 
promoted to Senior Lecturer in 2017.
Arif Ahmed was awarded a Leverhulme 
Research Fellowship in 2018 for his project 
‘The Value of the Future’. He has also been 
awarded a grant by the Effective Altruism 
Foundation, starting in 2019.
Tim Button’s Philosophy and Model 
Theory (with Sean Walsh) was chosen for 
a 2019 American Philosophical Association 
Symposium and a 2020 ‘Author-meets-
Critics’ session.
Clare Chambers was awarded the 
American Political Science Association 
David Easton Award 2018 for her book 
Against Marriage: An Egalitarian Defence of 
the Marriage-Free State. She was awarded 
a major Leverhulme Research Fellowship 
in 2018 for her project ‘Intact: The Political 
Philosophy of the Unmodified Body’. 
People
Welcome to temporary lecturers Matt 
Bennett, Owen Griffiths and Shyane 
Siriwardena, who joined us in 2018; and 
Tom McClelland, Maeve McKeown and 
Alexander Roberts, who joined us in 2019.
Welcome to Spencer Johnston as British 
Academy Research Fellow; Yang Liu as 
Leverhulme Early Research Fellow; Tushar 
Menon who joins us as British Academy 
Research Fellow in 2019; and our greatly 
valued Junior Research Fellows (currently 8) 
at a range of Colleges. 
Welcome to Jo Harcus who has joined 
as our new Librarian and Newsletter Editor, 
and to Anna Simpson on the admin team, 
both in 2018.
Congratulations to Tim Button, who 
in 2019 takes up a position as Lecturer 
at University College London; and Tom 
Dougherty who in 2019 takes up a position 
as Associate Professor at University of North 
Carolina, Chapel Hill. Warmest thanks and 
good wishes to both.
Congratulations to Frisbee Sheffield, 
who in 2019 takes up a position as University 
Lecturer in Classics at Cambridge; Shyane 
Siriwardena, appointed to a Lectureship at 
Leeds Trinity University; and Rob Watt, to a 
Lectureship at Trinity College Oxford. 
Congratulations to Jenni Lecky-
Thompson, our former Librarian and 
Newsletter Editor, who in 2018 took up  
Tom Dougherty was awarded 
a Marshall Fellowship in 2018 at the 
Murphy Institute, University of Tulane.
Richard Holton delivered the Uehiro 
Lectures in Practical Ethics in 2018 at the 
University of Oxford, on ‘Illness and the 
Social Self’. 
Rae Langton was elected to the 
Academia Europaea in 2017. She 
delivered the H.L.A Hart Memorial 
Lecture in 2019 at Oxford, on 
‘Reimagining Free Speech’.
Professor Emerita Onora O’Neill was 
awarded the Berggruen prize in October 
2017 for a lifetime’s work on trust. 
Huw Price was appointed in 2018 to  
lead the strategic development of the  
Ada Lovelace Institute, whose mission is  
to ensure data and AI work for people  
and society.
Paulina Sliwa was awarded a 
Leverhulme Research Fellowship in 2018 
for her project ‘Telling right from wrong: 
moral testimony and moral knowledge’.
the position of Head of Library Services at 
Trinity Hall.
Congratulations to postdoctoral 
researchers and research fellows: Dragos 
Calma, appointed to University College 
Dublin as Associate Professor; Rachel 
Fraser, to University of Oxford as Associate 
Professor; Louise Hanson, to University 
of Durham as Associate Professor; Remco 
Heesen, to University of Western Australia 
as Lecturer; Carlo Rossi, to a position 
at Universidad Adolfo Ibañez, Chile; and 
Bernhard Salow, to University of Oxford as 
Associate Professor. 
Student News
The Craig Taylor Prize for best performance 
in the Tripos for Part IB was awarded to 
Stella Rhode (Trinity Hall) in 2017–18 and 
Margaret Long (Pembroke) in 2018–19; 
and for Part II to Micaela Solis (King’s) in 
2017–18, and Le Yu (King’s) in 2018–19. 
In postgraduate news, the Matthew 
Buncombe prize for best overall 
achievement in the MPhil was awarded to 
James Adams (St John’s) in 2017–18, and in 
2018–19 to Emma Curran (Trinity Hall) and 
Paula Keller (Newnham), shared. Alex 
Moran (Queens’) was awarded a MIND 
studentship, and Li Li Tan (St Catharine’s) 
a Jacobsen studentship, both in 2018–19.
Philosophy Tripos and MPhil graduates 
have recently accepted offers to pursue 
PhDs at a range of leading institutions 
including Oxford, UCL, Harvard, MIT, 
Stanford, the Humboldt University, as  
well as Cambridge.
In Memoriam
We are very sad to report that Margrit 
Edwards passed away in December 2018. 
Margrit was Principal Secretary in the 
Faculty for almost 16 years, before retiring 
in 2012.
